The 1919 Commission investigated cases and incidents involving over twenty thousand persons and contemplated the prosecution of some twelve thousand that it believed might have committed war crimes. But when the Allies' political will for international as well as national prosecutions in their own countries eroded, the plans for an international tribunal or national war crimes tribunals set up by the Allies were abandoned in favor of token national prosecutions in Germany. Thus, two years after conclusion of the Treaty of Versailles, the Allies, essentially for political reasons, decided not to establish a war crimes tribunal pursuant to Articles 227, 228 and 229. Instead, the Allies deferred to Germany for the prosecution of a limited number of German violators.11 The 1919 Commission's final list of persons to be prosecuted was reduced to 896 accused. However, Germany's reluctance to prosecute a large number of its own military and the dwindling resolve of some of the Allies brought the list of 896 down to 45 persons who were to be tried before the Criminal Senate of the Imperial Court of Justice sitting in Leipzig.12 In December 1919, Germany's parliament had passed a special law to carry out the provisions of Articles 227, 228, and 229 of the Treaty of Versailles. But when the plans for an international tribunal and Allied national war crimes tribunals were abandoned in favor of German prosecutions, two public acts were promulgated, in March 1920 and May 1921, respectively, to give the Imperial Court of Justice special jurisdiction to conduct national trials of cases referred to the court by the Allies.13 Since the Prosecutor General of the Imperial Court of Justice had the ultimate authority to initiate prosecutions, the forty-five cases presented by the Allies were further reduced to twelve that were actually tried.14 Of the twelve cases, six resulted in acquittals.15 Although the armistice had been signed on November 11, 1918 , the trials at Leipzig did not begin until May 23, 1921.16 During the three-year interim, world public opinion changed and the interest in prosecutions subsided.17 Additionally, German public opinion supported the accused officers and soldiers.18 In fact, the German people reacted with "indignation that German judges could be found to sentence the war criminals and the Press brought all possible pressure to bear on the court."19 Consequently, the Allies decided after all to prosecute accused war criminals in national trials according to Article 229 of the Treaty of Versailles.20 However, the Allies did not extradite any of the accused Germans, with the exception of Belgium,21 and France was the only Allied country to conduct in absentia trials.22
Although the Leipzig Trials were a failure, they nonetheless serve as an important historical precedent for war crimes trials. Moreover, the Leipzig Trials 1994] CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS 787 helped establish a principle: "to put on record before history that might is not right, and that men whose sole conception of the duty they owe to their country is to inflict torture upon others, may be put on their trial."23 Europe was tired and drained from the war and wanted peace. Most politicians felt that the war should be consigned to history and its effects not linger. Prosecutions would be contrary to such an approach. Political leaders deemed justice for the victims and the advancement of international justice, which was advocated by many, to be deleterious to political realism.24 Thus, impunity triumphed de facto over the earlier resolve of the Allies to have an uncompromising and uncompromised international justice system function independently of political considerations. That missed opportunity, however, haunted the world after World War ."25 Indeed, compromised justice always haunts succeeding generations. The UNWCC produced valuable legal research, provided advice to governments on how to set up and conduct international and national prosecutions, and served as a clearinghouse for information submitted by governments. The UNWCC received "dossiers" from different governments and, when satisfied with the sufficiency of their contents, recommended that the persons in question be prosecuted.30 It also communicated the "dossiers" to certain governments for eventual prosecutions. But the work of the UNWCC was not relied upon in the prosecutions carried out before the International Military Tribunal for the Prosecution of the Major War Criminals of the Axis (IMT).31 That prosecution was essentially a United States-led operation headed by Justice Robert Jackson, who set up his own investigation supported by the U.S. occupation forces in Germany.32 Justice Jackson's investigative operations also supplied information and support to the other three Allies: France, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union.
However, each of these countries essentially conducted its own investigations, though the United Kingdom and France made some use of UNWCC material.
Understandably, however, since most of the UNWCC's material originally came from governments, its "dossiers" did not always have anything to add to what had been submitted, even though the UNWCC had a committee to carry out "investi- 33 Allied Control Council Law No. 10, Dec. 20, 1945 , CONTROL COUNCIL FOR GERMANY, OFFICIAL GAZETrE No. 3, Jan. 31, 1946 IN GERMANY, 1946 -1955 (1989 sented by these respective Governments through the UNWCC was ignored, both by the Allies between 1944 and 1946 and by the Italian Government thereafter. Therefore, no extradition or prosecution ever ensued. The reasons for this situation were essentially political.
The Results of the Earlier Commissions
The 1919 Commission conducted a significant number of investigations and the 1943 UNWCC produced a great deal of evidence and information. The evidence and information accumulated by these two bodies were to be used in connection with international prosecutions and also national prosecutions. But this result did not obtain. It should be emphasized that, when the establishing powers originally set up these investigatory bodies, it was with the intention that they should produce evidence for prosecutions to take place before international and national tribunals. It was neither the paucity nor the inadequacy of evidence which precluded that result but, rather, the change in political will of the powers that had set up these institutions. After World War I, the major European Allies and the United States did not wish to antagonize Germany and its people any further. As to the aftermath of World War II, the Nuremberg IMT was the focus of attention.
The United States dominated these proceedings but made no use of the UNWCC; nor did the four major Allies in the "Subsequent Proceedings" pursuant to Con- In view of this lack of a formal connection, there were some early doubts as to whether the mandate of the Commission of Experts was to gather "evidence," as that word is understood in criminal prosecutions, or whether the term "evidence" in its mandate was only meant to be demonstrative of the type of violations that occurred in the context of the conflict. Since a tribunal had not yet been estab- ' SC Res. 780 (1992) , supra note 2, operative para. 5 SC Res. 827, supra note 9. Several governments had wanted to introduce amendments to the proposed statute, but it was feared that such a process would only delay its adoption. Therefore, no amendments were allowed, though the resolution itself contained a few substantive additions. The Commission consistently held the view that, irrespective of whether all or part of the conflict over all or part of the territory would be deemed a conflict of an international or a noninternational character, there were sufficient international legal norms applicable to all of the violations that were committed. Furthermore, the Commission held that genocide and "crimes against humanity" were proscriptive norms of jus cogens, which applied at all times and places regardless of the parties to the conflict or its characterization. The Commission also consistently took the view that, pursuant to its mandate, it would not consider any legal issues pertaining to the parties' claims regarding the legitimacy of the use of force.
In short, the Commission did not deal with claims of "aggression" and "selfdefense," but only with conduct in connection with the jus in bello and other violations of international humanitarian law in the course of the armed conflict irrespective of its characterization.
58 SC Res. 780, supra note 2, operative para. 1. 78 The Annexes to the Final Report are expected to be over 3,000 pages long.
7 To keep track of the 64,000 pages of documents, an elaborate system was established for recording the documents as they were received.
80 In addition to being a visual record, the archive of video tapes also helps witnesses identify places and persons, including perpetrators. The Ovcara (Vukovar) mass-grave exhumation was not completed because of local political obstacles.90 The Commission learned in November 1992 that a mass grave contained approximately two hundred bodies of presumably murdered Croats who were at the Vukovar hospital on November 20-21, 1991, when the Yugoslav National Army (JNA) and Krajina Serb militias took control of the hospital and the city. After months of negotiations between representatives of the Commission and the Serbian political authorities in control of the Krajina area, the Commission received several written approvals from the highest political authorities to conduct the investigation.91 However, when the team of sixty-five military engineers, investigators and forensic experts arrived in October 1993, a local Serbian militia commander informed them that the so-called Republika The mass-grave investigations required difficult logistical preparation and organization, as well as significant personnel and financial resources, which were contributed by a few governments.'02 Mass-grave exhumations are like complex archaeological expeditions requiring labor-intensive, methodical work. The forensic experts from Physicians for Human Rights used the most current technological equipment, such as sophisticated electronic mapping procedures to allow the team to measure and map precisely the entire grave-site area, artifacts, human remains, and other objects. In addition, still photography and video cameras recorded all activity at the grave site, the forensic methods utilized, and the identification of objects found. As in archaeological work, after the area was cleared of 92 Id. at 63-64, paras. 271-73.
:' Id. at 64, para. 275. The Croatian Government was given the same privilege.
9 See text at and note 139 infra.
Final Report, supra note 40, at 65, para. 276. The grave site is protected by soldiers from a nearby Russian UNPROFOR unit. 98 Id. at 65, para. 277. 9 Id., para. 278. para. 281. 101 Id. at 66, para. 283. The grave site was protected by a unit of UNPROFOR's Jordanian battalion until July 1994, when Croatia requested that the area be placed under the control of its army, the H.V.
102 The contributing Governments were Canada, the Netherlands, and the United States. Sixty-five persons were directly involved in these operations. growth and topsoil, small tools and brushes were used to expose the At all times during the process, precautions were taken to ensure that evidence was properly preserved and that the remains were kept in a way that would enhance preservation."' Three separate investigative projects were also undertaken under the direction of three members of the Commission. First, Commissioner Greve conducted a comprehensive study of the Prijedor area, which resulted in the accumulation of several hundred pages of testimony from victims and witnesses located in several counties. The testimony focused on "ethnic cleansing" and other violations of international humanitarian law in that region of Bosnia.'05 A confidential summary report was delivered to the Office of the Prosecutor of the ICTFY shortly after the Commission officially terminated its work and the project is expected to produce the bases for some early prosecutorial action. Second, Commissioner 08 The Commission, by agreement with the Acting Deputy Prosecutor, Graham Blewitt (Australia), decided not to take formal statements of victims and witnesses in order not to prejudice the Prosecutor's subsequent work and also not to have statements that could be used later to impeach witnesses at trial. This was not the Commission's only concern. Concern for the victims' and witnesses' safety and privacy, as well as their emotional state, was paramount. 112 See Final Report, supra note 40, Ann. IV, pt. 3.
11'3 Final Report, supra note 40, at 37-43, paras. 151-82.
114 At first, UNPROFOR did not provide the Commission with information on violations of international humanitarian law on the grounds that it was contrary to its mandate. The Civil Police of UNPROFOR (CIVPOL) also did not give the Commission detailed reports of its investigations until after April 1993, when more information was forthcoming, though sketchy. In September 1993, the situation changed and UNPROFOR started to conduct some detailed investigations, particularly on the Medak Pocket incident, supra note 89, and the Stupni Do incident, which involved the destruction of a village and the brutal killing of a large number of its inhabitants.
11'5 Regrettably, the European Community Monitoring Mission has never had a centralized documentation center where all of its reports could be kept and cataloged. 1"7 Final Report, supra note 40, at 9, 10, 12, paras. 18, 25, 37. 118 The information received from the "warring parties" was useful. In many cases, the information was quite detailed and accompanied by statements of victims and witnesses. The Governments of Bosnia-Hercegovina and Croatia were particularly cooperative.
19 See text at and note 114 supra. A question arises with respect to UN missions using military personnel, such as UNPROFOR, whether common Article 1 of the four Geneva Conventions, which requires all parties to enforce the Conventions, includes the duty to report at least "grave breaches" Nations and its accomplishments bring credit to the Organization. Perhaps because of its uniqueness, the Commission's beginnings were difficult. In time, some of the difficulties were overcome. It is a tribute to the commitment, diligence and ingenuity of the members, staff and others who assisted the Commission in its work that so much was done with so little in such a limited amount of time.
Although politics is always a factor in the work of such bodies, there was no direct political interference in the Commission's work. However, the lack of resources and bureaucratic difficulties, which are part of UN organizational life, led to delays and frustrations. Some saw in these delays and difficulties the hidden hand of a political agenda designed to cripple or slow the Commission's work.
Others, more familiar with United Nations realities, shrugged off such speculation. But, as with so many things in life, the truth probably lies somewhere in between.
Once the Tribunal was established, there was unnecessary uncertainty about the role and future of the Commission and its relationship to the Tribunal. Three 137 The Commission notified the Secretary-General of its views concerning the premature term tion and its consequences. However, it appeared that several members of the Security Council, particularly permanent members including the United States, favored earlier termination. The significance of an eventual new and broader mandate for the Commission is obvious, as the Prosecutor must necessarily focus on specific cases. Consequently, there is a need for continuing to investigate such policies and practices as "ethnic cleansing," 144 "systematic rape," 145 the use of "special forces, "146 and other questions of law and facts pertaining to issues of genocide147 and crimes against humanity.148 None of these options, however, seem to have been found acceptable by some permanent members of the Security Council. Some of them felt that the continuation of the Commission might interfere with the work of the Prosecutor of the ICTFY, which would be a valid consideration if the new mandate were not carefully defined and judiciously carried out. Because this option was not accepted, the larger picture may regrettably be lost. Such a loss will be particularly tragic if the ICTFY is able to prosecute only a limited number of cases, which may not necessarily include senior commanders and political decision makers.
The Commission's establishment is, however, an important precedent that was already relied upon in the establishment of a similar commission for Rwanda on 44 See Final Report, supra note 40, at [33] [34] [35] [36] [37] 141 Id. at 24-27, paras. 87-101. 148 Id. at 20-24, paras. 72-86. 149 SC Res. 775 (July 1, 1994) . However, no contacts were established between the Rwanda Commission and members of the Commission of Experts. Thus, the opportunity to transfer valuable knowledge and experience was lost. international criminal tribunal.152 The experiences of the Commission and the ICTFY will certainly prove relevant to these efforts. They will be among the bases relied upon by governments and world public opinion to judge the merits of establishing a permanent international criminal justice system. Just as Nuremberg and Tokyo are judged by their historical legacy,'53 so will the Commission and the ICTFY be judged. But, above all, we must establish truth and try to provide justice.
The parties to the conflict expect it, particularly the victims and witnesses. 154
Impunity cannot be the reward of those who plan, order or commit such international crimes.
As one who has seen and heard so many terrible accounts of atrocities, I must bear witness to such events. We cannot fail at the very least to bring truth to light.
That is why the premature ending of the Commission was, in my judgment, a mistake, for it is unlikely that any other body will pursue the overall investigations that the Commission undertook. Lord Wright, chairman of the UNWCC, stated the following in 1948:
Over the whole earth there seems to hang a black storm cloud of war under which the nations cower. If the storm breaks and the waves of war beat against the lands, the power of law is not likely to sweep back the ocean, but the atrociousness of the tempest may be weakened in some degree by the effect of the lessons and rules derived from the last war. Even in the fury of the passions the small still voice of justice and of conscience may, however faintly, be heard, if prudence and humanity are of no avail even in this boasted age of civilisation. Must we again recur to the days of Attila or Genghis Khan or Tamerlane?'55 The challenge to a new world order remains to be met, but justice is its foundation. Indeed, without justice, there can be no lasting peace in this or any other conflict. To paraphrase George Santayana: are we condemned to repeat our mistakes because we refuse or are unable to learn from the lessons of the past?
